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The Many Faces And Facets 
Of War: 
Redrawing The Boundaries 
And Focus Of Warfare 
In Contemporary 
International Affairs 
Dr. Tang Siew Mun 
From the times of the Roman legion to the thunderous roar of the Soviet 
T-34 tanks, wars have shaped and literally drawn the boundaries of 
humanity. Although wars in contemporary times are less frequent than 
a few centuries ago, modern wars are more lethal and destructive. It is 
this singular feature - large scale destruction - that sets wars apart from 
other forms of conflict. Wars have been waged in various intensities and 
degrees and by diverse actors, but have traditionally been seen as the 
domain of states. In medieval times, wars were the "sports" of kings. 
Conceptually, war is defined as an armed conflict involving at least 
two nation-states. How does this characterization of war explain the 
types of conflicts that imperil a state's national interest and well-being 
without the use of force? How does this definition reconcile itself with 
the almost "war-like" threats posed by non-state actors? How does 
a state defend itself against foreign penetration and dissemination of 
information detrimental to its political stability and survival? This 
paper addresses these issues and argues that the traditional definition 
of war is too narrow. Wars are fought on many fronts and may not 
necessarily involve the use of armed violence. Globalization has 
brought to the fore new challenges to state sovereignty and security. 
Issues such as trade wars and the spread of pandemic diseases do not 
fall under the traditional understanding of "war" but are no less lethal 
and destructive. This calls for a broader definition of war to encompass 
dimensions of non-militarized conflicts and means of engagement. 
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War is the bane of humanity. It conjures images of death, suffering 
and destruction. Yet, war is very part of our history. Martial skills 
and leadership are honored and remembered. Long after their demise, 
military leaders such as Alexander the Great, Caesar and Sultan Saladin, 
and their exploits continue to capture our imaginations, and if the 
success of Alexander and Patton is any indication, our popular culture 
as well. The mass media has also helped to perpetuate the heroism of 
wartime leaders. For example, the 1998 US TV documentary honors 
the nine US five-star generals as "Gods of War."10 Notwithstanding 
the commercialization and even the romanticization of war, it remains 
humanity's greatest challenge to rid the world of this scourge. War is 
very much intertwined with the development of humanity. "The written 
history of the world is largely a history of warfare, because the states 
within which we live came into existence largely through conquest, 
civil strife or struggles for independence."11 Indeed, according to John 
Keegan, "warfare is as old as man himself'.12 As man evolved through 
the ages, surely war has changed as well. War is a complex and dynamic 
social phenomenon. This paper attempts to examine how the traditional 
definition of "war" measures up to contemporary conflicts. It argues 
that war - in its exclusive - focus as an inter-state interaction and its 
preoccupation with the use of armed violence misses out on various 
dimensions of threats that challenges state sovereignty and security. 
This paper contains three sections. First, it lays out the definitions 
of war. Second, it argues that wars fought for territorial conquest is 
losing its relevance. The third section lays out the argument that the 
underlining principle of war as a type of conflict remains, but the means 
to wage wars goes beyond the use of armed violence. Thus, while the 
traditional means of warfare though the use of force is waning, it has 
brought to fore "new" means of warfare. 
10
 These are General George C. Marshall, General Douglas Mac Arthur, General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, General Omar N. Bradley, Admiral William D. Leahy, 
Admiral Ernest J. King, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Admiral William F. «Bull» Halsey 
and General Henry Arnold. 
11
 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Hutchinson, 1993), p. 386. 
12
 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Defining "War" 
Carl von Clausewitz saw war as "an act of force to compel our enemy to 
do our will."13 It is a contest of will between two parties with the ultimate 
aim to defeat the enemy. He offered that "[s]o as long as I have not 
overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me."14 
He further noted that"... if you are to force the enemy, by making war on 
him, to do your bidding, you must either make him literally defenseless 
or at least put him in a position that makes this danger probable."15 
War, in the Clausewitzian world, takes on a zero-sum perspective. The 
goal of warfare is to disarm and render the enemy weak or vulnerable. 
In a more recent explanation of war, Quincy Wright defined war as a 
"conflict among political groups, especially sovereign states, carried on 
by armed forces of considerable magnitude or a considerable period of 
time."16 In a review of definitions used by various scholars, Benjamin 
Most and Harvey Starr outlined war as events to involve: 
(a) at least two parties, one of which is a nation; 
(b) conflictual goals; 
(c) parties that are aware of their conflicting goals; 
(d) parties that are willing to attain a goal which they recognize 
conflicts with the wishes of other(s); 
(e) situations in which each party has the opportunity or capacity to 
pursue its goal; 
(f) situations in which at least one party is able to resist another's use 
of overt military force to the extent that it avoids "immediate" 
defeat, suffers a minimal number of casualties, and/or inflicts a 
minimal number of casualties on the other(s); and 
13
 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter 
Paret) (London: Everyman, 1993), p.83. 
14
 Ibid., p. 86. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Martin A. Nettleship, "Definitions" in Martin A. Nettleship, R. Dalegivnes, Anderson 
Nettleship (Eds.) War, Its Causes and Correlates (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 
1975), p. 81. 
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(g) situations in which no party that is willing to use overt military 
force can attain its goal with only a single use of force or with a 
series of such acts that are highly dispersed over time.17 
Summing up the various definitions and perspectives on war, Most and 
Starr defines war as ... 
a particular type of outcome of the interaction of at least dyadic 
sets of specified varieties of actors in which at least one actor is 
willing and able to use some specified amount of military force 
for some specified of time against some other, resisting actor and 
in which some specified minimal number of fatalities (greater than 
zero) occur.18 
It is clear from the definitions aforementioned that war is seen as 
an activity that involves the use of force involving at least two parties. 
As only states enjoy the monopoly on the use of force and organized 
violence, it is easy to understand why wars are often associated with 
states. In the Clause witzian world, wars were indeed the purview of 
states. In fact, he explained that "war is not merely an act of policy but a 
true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried 
on with other means."19 Waging war is a tool to protect and further 
a state's interest. However, the validity of war as the sole purview of 
states is tenuous. Although most wars involve states, increasingly wars 
involve non-state actors. Thus, defining wars as an exclusive armed 
confrontation between states do not have the same ring to it in the days 
of Clausewitz as they do today. Wars have changed and have grown 
out of the strictures of the Clause witzian mold. The Correlates of War 
(COW) project addressed this anomaly. Small and Singer employed a 
tripartite categorization of war: interstate, extrastate and intracommunal. 
All three typologies of wars must fulfill the criteria of incurring at least 
1,000 battle deaths and involves the use of force. They are differentiated 
17
 Benjamin A. Most & Harvey Starr, "Conceptualizing 'War": Consequences for 
Theory and Research" in Diehl, Paul, War, Vol. 1 (London: Sage, 2005). p. 43. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 von Clausewitz, On War, p. 99. 
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by the actors. Interstate wars are fought between states. Extrastate wars 
are "armed conflicts between states and nonstate political entities."20 
Intracommunal wars are "fought between two groups within the state 
(neither party being the government)21 and have a decidedly domestic 
focus. In contrast, interstate and extrastate wars are international 
conflicts. These categories of war clearly spell out the parties involved 
and the use of force resulting in a set number of casualties. The 
numerical threshold was set as a criteria for armed conflicts to "qualify" 
as a war to enable a realistic study of the phenomenon by eliminating 
armed confrontations of "minor" consequences. The casualty criterion 
is undoubtedly an academic construct, but it is a pragmatic solution to 
represent the gravity and seriousness of the business that is war. 
Other scholars have attempted to improve the specificity of wars. 
Mary Kaldor argued the existence of a breed of "new wars" that are 
"rooted in divergent claims to power based on national, clan, religious 
or linguistic characteristics."22 "New wars" reflects the emergence of a 
type of warfare based on identities to forge its own independent political 
entity. An example of such wars is Bosnia-Herzegovenia. This kind of war 
sought "to control the population by getting rid of everyone of a different 
identity ... Hence the strategic goal of these wars is population expulsion 
through various means, such as mass killing, forcible resettlement, as 
well as a range of political, psychological and economic techniques of 
intimidation."23 Chris Gray used the nomenclature "postmodern war" to 
highlight the extensive use of technology and computers in the conduct 
of war. Specifically, this type of "warfare is exemplified by the Gulf War, 
in which the strategy and tactics of the winning coalition were facilitated 
by sophisticated high-technology data generating and information-
processing equipment, and battlefield engagements often approximated 
a form of "cyberwar" where belligerents (primarily in the case of the 
UN coalition) relied on high-technology "smart" weapon systems to 
20
 Errol A. Henderson & J. David Singer, '"New Wars and Rumors of 'New Wars'" in 
Diehl, Paul, War, Vol. 1 (London: Sage, 2005), p. 413. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Henderson & Singer, p. 400 
23
 Ibid. 
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engage the adversary."24 Edward Rice's "war of the third kind" focused 
"on protracted, generally nonconventional, largely intrastate wars that 
typified the armed conflicts raging throughout the postcolonial (third) 
world in the post-World War II era."25 Meanwhile, Kalevi Holsti's 
"people's war" "are primarily guerilla campaigns fought by militarized 
communal groups against either government forces or other militarized 
groups within the states.26 Between the typologies of wars offered by 
Kaldor, Gray, Rice and Holsti, it covers a broad range of wars that are 
primarily domestic in orientation. Gray's postmodern war stands apart 
from the other formulations in that it focused in the advances in the 
tools of warfare and how technology transformed wars. To be sure, the 
advent of new inventions had changed the form and scope of warfare. 
Karen Mingst's summary of the evolution of warfare as shown in Table 
1 depicts how a physical confrontation had grown into a complex and 
multifacetedduel. 
The Diminishing Returns Of Conquest And War 
Historically, wars are associated with the conquest of territories. The 
acquisition and control of territories bring to the conqueror prestige, 
power and wealth. Land is linked to riches. Land - assuming the 
successful pacification of the vanquished - brings to the victorious 
party additional workforce. Land is also tied to economic power. Land, 
along with additional workforce, increases the capacity of the state to 
support a larger population base, which in turn strengthens the state's 
productive capacity. Additionally, the economic base of the state is 
increased by the sources of wealth derived from mining activities such 
as coal, steel, oil and other minerals. Thus, it is easy to understand the 
allure of states to solidify their power bases through conquest. This is 
the prime reason for imperialism. From the diamond mines in South 
Africa to the tin mines in Malaya, control of strategic and high-value 
minerals and products through conquest had brought immense wealth 
Ibid., p. 401. 
Ibid., p. 401. 
Ibid., p. 402. 
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to the colonial masters. In other words, conquest pays. 
If conquest is as alluring as depicted, why doesn't wars happen 
more frequently now? Why work when it is more efficient to steal and 
plunder? Why buy when you can own and control the sources of supply? 
The coming of globalization had all but rendered the benefits of conquest 
irrelevant. Stephen Brooks argued that the globalization of production 
affects the benefits of conquest. He attributed this phenomenon to four 
factors: (a) the rise of knowledge-based economies, (b) the increase 
geographic dispersion of production, (c) the increase significance of 
interfirm alliances, and (d) increase ease of foreign direct investment 
(FDI).27 We would examine each in turn. 
In the postwar era, most advanced industrialized countries had 
begun to move from "economies based on land (agriculture/industrial 
economies) to ones primarily based on human capital (knowledge-
based economies).28 Mass education empowers the population and 
the institutionalization of "k-economy" enabled a wider segment of 
the population who possesses specialized or relevant expertise to be 
the generators and carrier of national wealth. Concomitantly, these 
individuals would withhold their expertise and refuse to work with 
the conquerors, hence effectively negatively impacting the benefits of 
conquest. 
Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits 
of Conquest," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October 1999), pp. 
655-666. 
Ibid., p. 655. 
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Table 1 : How War Fighting Has Changed Over Time 
PERIOD MEANS 
Prehistoric times Clubs; rocks; bands of 
tribes. 
Ancient times Swords; shields; spears; 
arrows; chariots; cavalry; 
Romans used precise tactics 
with infantry and cavalry in 
coordination; Mongols 
used cavalry and foraged off 
the land. 
Medieval times Fortifications and castles; 
introduction and use of 
longbow; gunpowder and 
cannons. 
Eighteenth century through Increased emphasis on naval 
warfare and control of 
The American Civil War 
World War I 
seas; shifting formations of 
infantry; rifling of guns and 
cannons for greater range; rise 
of professional armies. 
Trench warfare; chemical 
weapons; introduction of 
tanks and aircraft; large -
scale use of machine guns; 
submarine warfare. 
World War II Blitzkrieg combines tactical 
airpower with rapid armor 
advances to achieve 
operational objectives 
beyond merely attacking 
frontline forces; strategic 
bombardment takes war 
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beyond front lines to populace 
and production centers; first 
truly global war; introduction 
of nuclear weapons. 
Cold War Nuclear standoff with triad 
of long-range bombers, land-
based intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles; air 
forces developed long-range 
missiles and precision delivery 
capabilities; land forces 
became heavily armored 
maneuverable units. 
1991 Gulf War to the Present Dramatic increase in precision 
weapons and delivery 
technology; space exploitation 
affords information dominance 
in communications and 
intelligence; new protective 
technologies dramatically 
reduce combat deaths and 
injuries; de-emphasis of 
nuclear weapons; 
miniaturization of equipment 
enables combatants to 
conceal supplies; more 
sophisticated small chemical 
and biological weapons 
make terrorism easier to carry 
out; increased availability 
of small arms in international 
trade makes limited wars, civil 
wars, and terrorism easier to 
carry out. 
Source: Karen Mingst, Essentials of International Relations, 3rd. Ed. 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), p. 209. 
The geographical dispersion of production makes it more difficult for the 
conqueror to obtain the full benefits of conquest. Firms, in their search 
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for increased profits, have ventured beyond their home base and set up 
production bases in multiple areas. Advancement in communications 
had made it easier for the home base to coordinate and manage its 
subsidiaries located in multiple locations. "The increased geographic 
dispersion of production means that the conquering an advance country 
might result in possession of only a portion of the value-added chain."29 
Capturing the entire network would be costly and time-consuming. In 
other words, the dispersion of production had divided the "prize" in 
multiple locations, thereby reducing the attraction of conquest. 
The high costs associated with research and development had led 
to the increasing rise of inter-firm alliances. Besides the benefits of 
sharing the costs and risks of development, firms can also draw on 
the synergistic effects of such alliances. "For those firms within the 
conquered economy that are highly dependent on maintaining interfirm 
alliances with firms in other countries, and hence their productivity, 
might be imperiled by conquest." "Firms often have may different 
potential alliance partners from which to choose and are less likely to 
rely on a firm within a conquered territory whose ability to be a useful 
partner could be abruptly cut off at any moment."30 
States are rational actors. When presented with an array of options, 
it would behave "rationally" by choosing the most optimal choice. 
War is far from a cost-free option. Foreign direct investment is an 
option for states (or firms) to gain access and control foreign assets 
without resorting to the use of force. "The increased ease of engaging 
in FDI has meant that it has become progressively easier for many of 
the most economically advanced states to achieve most of the same 
ends of conquest without any of the costs (e.g. administrative burden, 
diplomatic isolation, war costs of taking territory, military reprisals by 
third parties)."31 
The arguments laid out by Brooks present a strong case that 
developed economies are unlikely to wage war because the spoils of 
Ibid., p. 660-661. 
Ibid., p. 664. 
Ibid., p. 665-666. 
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victory have reduced dramatically in the last fifty years. The primary 
cause for this development is the chances undergone by the international 
economic system, specifically the globalization of production. The 
levels of interconnectedness of the global economy would give pause 
to any aggressor bent on territorial aggrandizement. The US experience 
in Iraq aptly showed the difficulties to pacify and control a population 
that is bounded by strong nationalism and anti-Americanism. Has 
globalization succeeded in muffling the drums of war and ushered in a 
period of peace and prosperity? 
War And Warfare 
It is important to note that Brooks' arguments are confined to conquests 
and not necessarily war itself. The spread and maturation of globalization 
does not make obsolete wars. As Robert Gilpin reminds us, "one of the 
principle functions of war, [...] is to determine the international hierarchy 
of prestige and thereby determine which states will in effect govern the 
international system."32 Furthermore, "[a] country that would like to 
abolish war, however, must continue to be concerned about those that 
have kept it in their repertoire."33 Wars are fought for reasons other than 
economic. It remains the ultimate arbiter of conflicts among states. Even 
the vaunted ideals of collective security rely on the threat of punishment 
through war to maintain peace. To say that war is relevant is different 
from saying that wars are everyday occurrences. Wars are an integral 
facet of the international system. 
Fundamentally, war is a type of conflict. It is accorded a special 
position due to its ability to change and influence society and states. 
The scale of destruction attendant with wars is enough to merit the birth 
of a new discipline in the social sciences. International relations had its 
genesis to examine the question of war and peace. As long as conflicts 
Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), p. 33. 
Mueller, "The Obsolescence of Major War," in Diehl, Paul, War, Vol. 1 (London: 
Sage, 2005), p. 303. 
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are endemic in social affairs, wars cannot be ruled out and will continue 
to feature - one way or another - in international affairs. Having said 
that, it is important to distinguish between war and warfare. The former 
is a subset of conflict, while the latter refers to means of waging war. 
War remains a constant but the ways in which the contest is played out is 
changing. James Dunnigan, for example, explained that "[t]he next war 
is going to take place in a new battlefield; your own home. Cyberwarfare 
is the battle for the control of the Internet and the large chunk of our 
economy that now depends on this network of computers.34 In a scenario 
dubbed "an electronic Pearl Harbor," "some country or terrorist might 
attack U.S. computers in one sudden bolt-out-of-the-blue strike, cause 
death, destruction, and mayhem. Armies would not be able to leave 
their barracks. Airlines would fall out of the skies. Wall Street would 
collapse."35 In explaining the electronic Pearl Harbor, Bruce Berkowitz 
may have taken some literary liberty to simplify the ease in which such 
a probable attack might take place and its consequences. Nevertheless, 
cyberwarfare represents a new class of warfare that is distinguished 
from its traditional variant. In cyberwarfare, the "warriors" do not meet 
and such wars are not exclusively targeted at military targets. It seeks 
out vulnerable points and exploits them to disrupt or incapacitate the 
daily lives of its target. Robert Mandel noted that: 
Many analysts now argue that disrupting or distorting security 
information systems, rather than attacking traditional military targets, 
will be the primary thrust of future wars. If each system becomes the 
center of gravity for modern militaries, it becomes the logical targets 
of others, and for this reason information warfare is often cited as the 
leitmotif of early 21st century conflict.36 
By gaining access and control of critical electronic nodes and 
electronic networks, these "hackers" can effectively render a nation's 
defenses hapless given our near-total reliance on computers and electronic 
James F. Dunnigan, The Next War Zone: Confronting the Global Threat of 
Cyberterrorism (New York: Citadel Press, 2002), p. 5. 
Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st 
Century ((New York: The Free Press, 2003), p. 140. 
Robert Mandel, Security, Strategy and the Quest for Bloodless War (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 126. 
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communications. "Modern warfare requires more than ever before 
speedy and reliable data on targets and coordination of multifaceted 
strategy and tactics in the field, and operating blind - even when 
possessing overwhelming force advantages - is a sure path to defeat."37 
Thus, instead of taking the battle to the military, cyberwarfare takes on 
a wide range of targets and this effectively extends the "battlefield" to 
an indefinite specification of space. This is a departure from traditional 
warfare and raises the specter if the Clausewitzian formulation of war 
is suited to contemporary times when threats are manifested beyond 
invading armies. Nonetheless, "invasions" can and could be mounted in 
other forms. Besides cyberwarfare, wars are "fought" on many fronts. 
One such fronts is trade wars. 
Economic competition is a normal conduct in international affairs. 
However, trade wars represent a heightened state of affairs where parties 
involved are engaged in "abnormal" competition. The trade war between 
Japan and the US during the 1980s was not just about differences over 
Japan's favorable trade surplus vis-a-vis the US but threats of economic 
sanctions (e.g. non-tariff barriers and import restrictions) would do 
irreparable harm to the Japanese economy. 
States are also highly sensitive to challenges to its political stability 
and legitimacy. For this reason, governments monitor and often 
exert some form of control over the mass dissemination of news and 
information. However, in the age of Internet, the state's stranglehold 
on information and electronic content is slipping. The Chinese 
government, for example, closely monitors the Internet to identify and 
arrest subversive elements. Information is power and the ease in which 
information is sent and received over the Internet renders it increasingly 
for states to isolate its citizens from news outside its territory. During 
the Cold War, the US sponsored and ran Radio Free Europe, beaming 
a constant flow of pro-West (and anti-communist) information into 
Eastern Europe was an attempt to destabilize communist rule. This is yet 
another plane in which states utilize to protect and further their national 
interest. In the case of the communist states, their "battle" was to jam 
the transmission of Radio Free Europe. Clearly, warfare is not limited to 
the exchange of gunfire and could be fought in multiple channels, and 
37
 Ibid. 
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in this case, the airwaves of Eastern Europe. 
Conclusion 
The Clausewitzian conception of war remains valid. Wars are fought 
not only to subdue and, if possible, annihilate the enemy but as 
Clausewitz pointed out serve a political objective. Brooks' contention 
that conquest does not pay is taken. However, not all wars are fought 
for this end. War is undoubtedly a clash of wills by using force. This 
narrow conception limits wars to the physical violence. The objective 
of war goes beyond the protection of territorial integrity. It involves the 
imperative to secure the viability of the state and its citizens. A challenge 
to state sovereignty could be mounted without a direct attack on its 
military. If the goal is not conquest, there is no compelling reason to 
target the military. Instead "soft targets" such as the civilian population 
are easier prey as the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks reasoned. 
In fact, more than anything this terrorist attack shows the weakness of 
the formal definition of war. Wars are fought on different fronts. The 
days where soldiers line up on both ends of the battlefield to await their 
orders before attacking the enemy are numbered. When states can be 
attacked through non-lethal ways and in an indirect manner without 
any physical engagement, it gives pause to viability of seeing war as an 
armed conflict. The threat is changing and so too must our perspective 
on war. War remains a conflict involving at least one state but the nature 
of warfare must be broadened to take into account emerging and new 
forms of threats. 
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